different from GPT

GPT	spacy_nes	stanfordnlp_pos	truecasing
Historians argue that in the early Cold War an interdisciplinary research culture defined the RAND Corporation. However, a significant epistemological gap divided the members of RAND's Social Science Division (SSD) from the rest of the organization. While the social scientists used qualitative methods, most RAND researchers embraced quantified approaches and derided the social sciences as unscientific. This encouraged RAND's social scientists to develop a political-military simulation that embraced everything-politics, culture, and psychology-that RAND's other analysts largely ignored. Yet the fact that the SSD embraced gaming, a heuristic practiced throughout RAND, suggests that the political simulation was nonetheless inspired by social scientists' engagement with their colleagues. This indicates that the concept of interdisciplinarity should move beyond its implication of collaboration to incorporate instances in which research agendas are defined against but also shaped by colleagues in other disciplines. Such a rethinking of the term may make it possible to trace how varieties of interdisciplinary interaction historically informed knowledge production.	Historians argue That in the early cold war an interdisciplinary research culture defined the rand corporation. However, a significant epistemological gap divided the members of Rand's social science division (ssd) from the rest of the organization. While the social scientists used qualitative methods, most rand researchers embraced quantified approaches and derided the social sciences As unscientific. This encouraged rand's social scientists to develop a political-military simulation that embraced everything-politics, culture, and psychology-that rand's other analysts largely ignored. Yet the fact that the ssd embraced gaming, a heuristic practiced throughout rand, suggests That the political simulation was nonetheless inspired by social scientists' engagement with their colleagues. This indicates that the concept of interdisciplinarity should move beyond its implication of collaboration to incorporate instances in which research agendas are defined against but also shaped by colleagues in other disciplines. Such a rethinking of the term may make it possible to trace how varieties of interdisciplinary interaction historically informed knowledge production.	Historians argue That in the early cold war an interdisciplinary research culture defined the Rand corporation. However, a significant epistemological gap divided the members of Rand's social science division (ssd) from the rest of the organization. While the social scientists used qualitative methods, most rand researchers embraced quantified approaches and derided the social sciences As unscientific. This encouraged Rand's social scientists to develop a political-military simulation that embraced everything-politics, culture, and psychology-that Rand's other analysts largely ignored. Yet the fact that the ssd embraced gaming, a heuristic practiced throughout Rand, suggests That the political simulation was nonetheless inspired by social scientists' engagement with their colleagues. This indicates that the concept of interdisciplinarity should move beyond its implication of collaboration to incorporate instances in which research agendas are defined against but also shaped by colleagues in other disciplines. Such a rethinking of the term may make it possible to trace how varieties of interdisciplinary interaction historically informed knowledge production.	Historians argue that in the early cold war an Interdisciplinary research culture defined the rand corporation. However, a significant Epistemological gap divided the members of rand's social science division (Ssd) from the rest of the organization. While the social scientists used qualitative methods, most rand researchers embraced quantified approaches and Derided the social sciences as unscientific. This encouraged rand's social scientists to develop a Political-Military simulation that embraced Everything-Politics, culture, and Psychology-That rand's other analysts largely ignored. Yet the fact that the Ssd embraced gaming, a Heuristic practiced throughout rand, suggests that the political simulation was nonetheless inspired by social scientists' engagement with their colleagues. This indicates that the concept of Interdisciplinarity should move beyond its implication of collaboration to incorporate instances in which research Agendas are defined against but also shaped by colleagues in other disciplines. such a Rethinking of the term may make it possible to trace how varieties of Interdisciplinary interaction historically informed knowledge production.
This study aims at comparing operational codes (namely, philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the political universe) of political leaders from different cultures. According to Schwartz (2004), cultures can be categorised into 3 dimensions: autonomy-embeddedness, egalitarianism-hierarchy and mastery-harmony. This study draws upon the 1st dimension (akin to the most popular cultural dimension of Hofstede: individualism-collectivism) and focuses on comparing the leaders of autonomous and embedded cultures based on how cooperative/conflictual they are. The main research hypothesis is as follows: the leaders of embedded cultures would be more cooperative than the leaders of autonomous cultures. For this purpose, 3 autonomous cultures (the UK, Canada and Australia) and embedded cultures (Singapore, South Africa and Malaysia) cultures were chosen randomly and the cooperativeness of the correspondent countries' leaders were compared after being profiled by Profiler Plus. The results indicated that the leaders of embedded cultures were significantly more cooperative than autonomous cultures after holding the control variables constant. The findings were discussed in the light of relevant literature.	This study aims at comparing operational codes (namely, philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the political universe) of political leaders from different cultures. According to schwartz (2004), cultures can be categorised into 3 dimensions: Autonomy-embeddedness, egalitarianism-hierarchy and mastery-harmony. This study draws upon the 1st dimension (akin to the most popular cultural dimension of Hofstede: Individualism-collectivism) and focuses on comparing the leaders of autonomous and embedded cultures based on how cooperative/conflictual They are. The main research hypothesis is as follows: The leaders of embedded cultures would be more cooperative than the leaders of autonomous cultures. For this purpose, 3 autonomous cultures (the Uk, Canada and Australia) and embedded cultures (Singapore, South Africa and Malaysia) cultures were chosen randomly and the cooperativeness of the correspondent countries' leaders were compared after being profiled by profiler plus. The results indicated that the leaders of embedded cultures were significantly more cooperative than autonomous cultures after holding the control variables constant. The findings were discussed in the light of relevant literature.	This study aims at comparing operational codes (namely, philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the political universe) of political leaders from different cultures. According to Schwartz (2004), cultures can be categorised into 3 dimensions: Autonomy-embeddedness, egalitarianism-hierarchy and mastery-harmony. This study draws upon the 1st dimension (akin to the most popular cultural dimension of hofstede: Individualism-collectivism) and focuses on comparing the leaders of autonomous and embedded cultures based on how cooperative/conflictual They are. The main research hypothesis is as follows: The leaders of embedded cultures would be more cooperative than the leaders of autonomous cultures. For this purpose, 3 autonomous cultures (the Uk, Canada and Australia) and embedded cultures (Singapore, South Africa and Malaysia) cultures were chosen randomly and the cooperativeness of the correspondent countries' leaders were compared after being profiled by profiler plus. The results indicated that the leaders of embedded cultures were significantly more cooperative than autonomous cultures after holding the control variables constant. The findings were discussed in the light of relevant literature.	This study aims at comparing operational codes (namely, philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the political universe) of political leaders from different cultures. According to Schwartz (2004), cultures can be categorised into 3 dimensions: Autonomy-Embeddedness, Egalitarianism-Hierarchy and Mastery-Harmony. This study draws upon the 1ST dimension (akin to the most popular cultural dimension of Hofstede: Individualism-Collectivism) and focuses on comparing the leaders of autonomous and embedded cultures based on how Cooperative/Conflictual they are. The main research hypothesis is as follows: the leaders of embedded cultures would be more cooperative than the leaders of autonomous cultures. for this purpose, 3 autonomous cultures (the UK, Canada and Australia) and embedded cultures (Singapore, South Africa and Malaysia) cultures were chosen randomly and the Cooperativeness of the correspondent countries' leaders were compared after being Profiled by Profiler plus. The results indicated that the leaders of embedded cultures were significantly more cooperative than autonomous cultures after holding the control variables constant. The findings were discussed in the light of relevant literature.
Throughout Russian history, bouts of political reform have been repeatedly succeeded by reactionary periods of counter-reform. We surmise that this historical alternation of reform and counter-reform has been driven at least in part by comparisons made by Russians between their own situation and that of their counterparts in the West. Such "relative deprivation" understandings of political change are nothing new, but we tie the history of impetus for reform in Russia explicitly to fluctuations in economic performance in the capitalist West, as represented by Kondratiev waves (K-waves) of expansion and stagnation. We posit that periods of expansion in the West have prompted periods of political reform in Russia, while periods of stagnation in the West have enabled periods of counter-reform in Russia. Although a direct causal link cannot be drawn, the timing of periods of reform and counter-reform in Russia seems to be consistent with a relative deprivation interpretation.	Throughout Russian history, bouts of political reform have been repeatedly succeeded by reactionary periods of counter-reform. We surmise that this historical alternation Of reform and counter-reform has been driven at least in part by comparisons made by Russians between their own situation and that of their counterparts in the west. Such "relative deprivation" understandings of political change are nothing new, but we tie the history of impetus for reform in Russia explicitly to fluctuations in economic performance in the capitalist west, as represented by kondratiev waves (k-waves) of expansion and stagnation. We posit that periods of expansion in the west have prompted periods of political reform in Russia, While periods Of stagnation in the west have enabled periods of counter-reform in Russia. Although a direct causal link cannot be drawn, the timing of periods of reform and counter-reform in Russia seems to be consistent with a relative deprivation interpretation.	Throughout russian history, bouts of political reform have been repeatedly succeeded by reactionary periods of counter-reform. We surmise that this historical alternation Of reform and counter-reform has been driven at least in part by comparisons made by Russians between their own situation and that of their counterparts in the west. Such "relative deprivation" understandings of political change are nothing new, but we tie the history of impetus for reform in Russia explicitly to fluctuations in economic performance in the capitalist west, as represented by kondratiev waves (k-waves) of expansion and stagnation. We posit that periods of expansion in the west have prompted periods of political reform in Russia, While periods Of stagnation in the west have enabled periods of counter-reform in Russia. Although a direct causal link cannot be drawn, the timing of periods of reform and counter-reform in Russia seems to be consistent with a relative deprivation interpretation.	Throughout Russian history, bouts of political reform have been repeatedly succeeded by reactionary periods of Counter-Reform. We surmise that this historical alternation of reform and Counter-Reform has been driven at least in part by comparisons made by Russians between their own situation and that of their counterparts in the West. such "relative deprivation" understandings of political change are nothing new, but we tie the history of impetus for reform in Russia explicitly to fluctuations in economic performance in the capitalist West, as represented by Kondratiev waves (K-Waves) of expansion and stagnation. We Posit that periods of expansion in the West have prompted periods of political reform in Russia, while periods of stagnation in the West have enabled periods of Counter-Reform in Russia. Although a direct causal link cannot be drawn, the timing of periods of reform and Counter-Reform in Russia seems to be consistent with a relative deprivation interpretation.
Two separate strands of political science literature have reinvigorated the study of culture in international security in recent years through their methodological rigor and empirical accuracy: constructivism and organizational theory. It is important to recognize, though, that these literatures speak to particular roles of culture in strategic studies – and not those roles studied in the strategic culture literature. Indeed, that literature has not been as successful as the other two, suffering from over-determined predictions, empirical failures, and an unresolved debate about epistemology. Thus, there is a perplexing lacuna in the center of this field: a weak core of cultural analysis in international security coupled with stronger works at the periphery. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, organizational cultures tend to be more unified than the myriad strains in all national cultures. On the other, constructivism looks primarily to explain – and less often to predict – identity. Traditional strategic culture work suffers the worst of both worlds, striving for explanatory power but having to grapple with multiple, competing cultures, and so is weaker than either of the other schools. While culturally aware scholarship of specific political institutions and social actors of specific cases should be encouraged, policymakers and scholars should not expect much distinctive predictive utility from the strategic culture literature per se.	Two separate strands of political science literature have reinvigorated the study of culture in international security in recent years through their methodological rigor and empiric accuracy: constructivism and organizational theory. It is important to recognize, though, that these literatures speak to particular roles of culture in strategic studies – and not those roles studied in the strategic culture literature. Indeed, that literature has not been as successful as the other two, suffering from over-determined predictions, empirical failures, and an unresolved debate about epistemology. Thus, there is a perplexing lacuna in the centre of this field: A weak core of cultural analysis in international security coupled with stronger works at the periphery. There are two reasons for this. One the one hand, organizational cultures tend to be more unified Than the myriad strains in all national cultures. On the other, constructivism looks primarily to explain – and less often to predict – identity. Traditional strategic culture work suffers the worst of both worlds, striving for explanatory power but having to grapple with multiple, competing cultures, and so is weaker than either of the other schools. While culturally aware scholarship of specific political institutions and social actors of specific cases should be encouraged, policymakers and scholars should not expect much distinctive predictive utility from the strategic culture literature per se.	Two separate strands of political science literature have reinvigorated the study of culture in international security in recent years through their methodological rigor and empiric accuracy: constructivism and organizational theory. It is important to recognize, though, that these literatures speak to particular roles of culture in strategic studies – and not those roles studied in the strategic culture literature. Indeed, that literature has not been as successful as the other two, suffering from over-determined predictions, empirical failures, and an unresolved debate about epistemology. Thus, there is a perplexing lacuna in the centre of this field: A weak core of cultural analysis in international security coupled with stronger works at the periphery. There are two reasons for this. One the one hand, organizational cultures tend to be more unified Than the myriad strains in all national cultures. On the other, constructivism looks primarily to explain – and less often to predict – identity. Traditional strategic culture work suffers the worst of both worlds, striving for explanatory power but having to grapple with multiple, competing cultures, and so is weaker than either of the other schools. While culturally aware scholarship of specific political institutions and social actors of specific cases should be encouraged, policymakers and scholars should not expect much distinctive predictive utility from the strategic culture literature per se.	Two separate strands of political science literature have reinvigorated the study of culture in international security in recent years through their methodological rigor and Empiric accuracy: Constructivism and organizational theory. It is important to recognize, though, that these literatures speak to particular roles of culture in strategic studies – and not those roles studied in the strategic culture literature. Indeed, that literature has not been as successful as the other two, suffering from Over-Determined predictions, empirical failures, and an unresolved debate about epistemology. Thus, there is a perplexing Lacuna in the centre of this field: a weak core of cultural analysis in international security coupled with stronger works at the periphery. There are two reasons for this. One the one hand, organizational cultures tend to be more unified than the myriad strains in all national cultures. on the other, Constructivism looks primarily to explain – and less often to predict – identity. traditional strategic culture work suffers the worst of both worlds, striving for explanatory power but having to grapple with multiple, competing cultures, and so is weaker than either of the other schools. While culturally aware scholarship of specific political institutions and social actors of specific cases should be encouraged, policymakers and scholars should not expect much distinctive predictive utility from the strategic culture literature per se.
The subject of US perceptions of the Soviet threat would not have attracted the pathological interest it has if changes in US policy towards the Soviet Union since 1917 had been unambiguously related to fluctuations in Soviet words and actions. What requires explanation (and concern) is not good sight, but distorted vision; and in the superpower relationship there has been a widespread and justified diagnosis that the Soviet threat has been frequently misperceived. The outcome has been a mismatch between Soviet behaviour and US assessment of it.	The subject of Us perceptions of the Soviet threat would not have attracted the pathological interest it has if changes in Us policy towards The Soviet Union since 1917 had been unambiguously related to fluctuations in Soviet words and actions. What requires explanation (and concern) is not good sight, but distorted vision; and in the superpower relationship There has been a widespread and justified diagnosis that the Soviet threat has been frequently misperceived. The outcome has been a mismatch between Soviet behaviour and us assessment of it.	The subject of us perceptions of the soviet threat would not have attracted the pathological interest it has if changes in us policy towards The soviet union since 1917 had been unambiguously related to fluctuations in soviet words and actions. What requires explanation (and concern) is not good sight, but distorted vision; and in the superpower relationship There has been a widespread and justified diagnosis that the soviet threat has been frequently misperceived. The outcome has been a mismatch between soviet behaviour and us assessment of it.	The subject of us perceptions of the Soviet threat would not have attracted the pathological interest it has if changes in us policy towards the Soviet Union since 1917 had been unambiguously related to fluctuations in Soviet words and actions. What requires explanation (and concern) is not good sight, but distorted vision; and in the superpower relationship there has been a widespread and justified diagnosis that the Soviet threat has been frequently Misperceived. The outcome has been a mismatch between Soviet behaviour and us assessment of it.
The American decision to deploy missile defence in Poland endangered the central myth of Putin's regime (Russia's rebirth as a great power), challenged the status of Putin as Russia's strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully scripted campaign for succession to Putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons. The character of Russian policy-making has guaranteed the worst-case scenario evaluation of the American programme. The Russian elite's world view has magnified the problems resulting from the deployment into fears of a window of vulnerability.	The American decision to deploy missile defence in Poland endangered the central myth of putin's regime (Russia's rebirth as a great power), challenged the status of putin As Russia's strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully scripted campaign for succession to putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia's reliance On nuclear weapons. The character of Russian policy‐making has guaranteed the worst‐case scenario evaluation of the American programme. The Russian elite's world view has magnified the problems resulting from the deployment into fears of a window of vulnerability.	The american decision to deploy missile defence in Poland endangered the central myth of Putin's regime (Russia's rebirth as a great power), challenged the status of Putin As Russia's strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully scripted campaign for succession to Putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia's reliance On nuclear weapons. The character of russian policy‐making has guaranteed the worst‐case scenario evaluation of the american programme. The russian elite's world view has magnified the problems resulting from the deployment into fears of a window of vulnerability.	The American decision to deploy missile defence in Poland endangered the central myth of Putin's regime (Russia's rebirth as a great power), challenged the status of Putin as Russia's strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully Scripted campaign for succession to Putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons. The character of Russian Policy‐Making has guaranteed the Worst‐Case scenario evaluation of the American programme. The Russian elite's world view has magnified the problems resulting from the deployment into fears of a window of vulnerability.
The momentum of the Soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s shows every sign of being carried over into the 1980s. Serial production of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft, medium-range bombers and missiles, as well as cruisers and aircraft carriers, is continuing. New weapons are being developed and tested. New large military production plants and assembly buildings are being constructed. The technological gap in weapon systems has been closed in many areas, and in some areas the Soviet Union has taken the lead.	The momentum of the Soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s shows every sign of being carried over into the 1980s. serial production of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft, medium-range bombers and missiles, As well as cruisers and aircraft carriers, is continuing. New weapons are being developed and tested. New large military production plants and assembly buildings are being constructed. The technological gap in weapon systems has been closed in many areas, and in some areas The Soviet Union Has taken the lead.	The momentum of the soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s shows every sign of being carried over into the 1980s. serial production of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft, medium-range bombers and missiles, As well as cruisers and aircraft carriers, is continuing. New weapons are being developed and tested. New large military production plants and assembly buildings are being constructed. The technological gap in weapon systems has been closed in many areas, and in some areas the soviet union Has taken the lead.	The momentum of the Soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s shows every sign of being carried over into the 1980s. Serial production of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft, Medium-Range bombers and missiles, as well as cruisers and aircraft carriers, is continuing. New weapons are being developed and tested. New large military production plants and assembly buildings are being constructed. The technological gap in weapon systems has been closed in many areas, and in some areas the Soviet Union has taken the lead.
Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the Automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.	Whether China's strategic culture is offensive Or defensive In nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the korean war, the Sino-Indian war, and the sino-vietnam war shows A defensive pattern that johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of mao zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated verbs in context system (vics) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to johnston's analysis. The results indicate that johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of mao zedong reveals A more complex reality than did johnston's analysis. The results partly support johnston's claim about mao as an offensive realist, But this result cannot be generalized across situations, As the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs Are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.	Whether China's strategic culture is offensive Or defensive In nature is an interesting question in understanding chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the korean war, the Sino-indian war, and the Sino-Vietnam war shows A defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated verbs in context system (vics) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals A more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, But this result cannot be generalized across situations, As the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs Are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.	Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a Parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean war, the Sino-Indian war, and the Sino-Vietnam war shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. by analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated verbs in context system (Vics) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The Operational-Code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the International historical setting.
Control over exportable oil resources means control over the economic and political destinies of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Russia wants that control. Azerbaijan will be the test.	Control over exportable oil resources means control over the economic and political destinies of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and turkmenistan. Russia wants that control. Azerbaijan will be the test.	Control over exportable oil resources means control over the economic and political destinies of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Russia wants that control. Azerbaijan will be the test.	Control over exportable oil resources means control over the economic and political destinies of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Russia wants that control. Azerbaijan will be the test.
Abstract The Eisenhower administration's tough containment policy toward China has been conventionally viewed as an unsensible policy resulting from domestic political pressures or ideology. Refuting the conventional explanations, this article argues that during the early Cold War, the US superiority in bipolarity drove China to balance the United States in Asia. Dulles, the architect of the China policy, made accurate assessments of the power structure in Asia and the inevitable enmity with China. Driven by structural imperative, he decided to pursue containment to maintain the favourable balance of power in Asia by retarding the relative power growth of China allied with the Soviet Union and secondarily by accelerating their conflict through harder pressure on a weaker China. This case long considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory actually demonstrates how powerfully distributions of power shape alliance behaviours of states in the anarchic international system.	Abstract the eisenhower administration's tough containment policy Toward China has been conventionally viewed as an unsensible policy resulting from domestic political pressures or ideology. Refuting the conventional explanations, this article argues that during the early cold war, the Us superiority in bipolarity drove China to balance The United States in asia. Dulles, the architect of the China policy, made accurate assessments of the power structure in asia and the inevitable enmity with China. Driven by structural imperative, he decided to pursue containment to maintain the favourable balance of power in asia by retarding the relative power growth of China Allied With The Soviet Union and secondarily by accelerating their conflict through harder pressure on a weaker China. This case long considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory actually demonstrates how powerfully distributions of power shape alliance behaviours of states in the anarchic international system.	Abstract the Eisenhower administration's tough containment policy Toward China has been conventionally viewed as an unsensible policy resulting from domestic political pressures or ideology. Refuting the conventional explanations, this article argues that during the early cold war, the us superiority in bipolarity drove China to balance the United States in Asia. Dulles, the architect of the China policy, made accurate assessments of the power structure in Asia and the inevitable enmity with China. Driven by structural imperative, he decided to pursue containment to maintain the favourable balance of power in Asia by retarding the relative power growth of China Allied With the soviet union and secondarily by accelerating their conflict through harder pressure on a weaker China. This case long considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory actually demonstrates how powerfully distributions of power shape alliance behaviours of states in the anarchic international system.	Abstract the Eisenhower administration's tough containment policy toward China has been conventionally viewed as an Unsensible policy resulting from domestic political pressures or ideology. Refuting the conventional explanations, this article argues that during the early cold war, the us superiority in Bipolarity drove China to balance the United States in Asia. Dulles, the architect of the China policy, made accurate assessments of the power structure in Asia and the inevitable enmity with China. driven by structural imperative, he decided to pursue containment to maintain the favourable balance of power in Asia by retarding the relative power growth of China Allied with the Soviet Union and secondarily by accelerating their conflict through harder pressure on a weaker China. This case long considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory actually demonstrates how powerfully distributions of power shape alliance Behaviours of States in the anarchic international system.
This study uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnson's general operational code as revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.	This study uses the verbs in context system (vics) to analyze and compare the operational codes of president lyndon johnson and his advisors during the vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in johnson's general operational code As revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb north vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in south vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of johnson and those of his advisors.	This study uses the verbs in context system (vics) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnson's general operational code As revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.	This study uses the verbs in context system (Vics) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnson's general operational code as revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.
This study explores the issues involved in creating a regional security regime in the Middle East using insights from the levels of analysis framework of international relations theory. In doing so, Spiegel focuses on the means which can be implemented in the region in order to improve the prospects for establishing such a regime.	This study explores the issues involved in creating a regional security regime in the middle east using insights from the levels of analysis framework of international relations theory. In doing so, spiegel focuses on the means which can be implemented in the region in order to improve the prospects for establishing such a regime.	This study explores the issues involved in creating a regional security regime in the middle east using insights from the levels of analysis framework of international relations theory. In doing so, spiegel focuses on the means which can be implemented in the region in order to improve the prospects for establishing such a regime.	This study EXPLORES the issues involved in creating a regional security regime in the Middle East using insights from the levels of analysis framework of international relations theory. In doing so, Spiegel focuses on the means which can be implemented in the region in order to improve the prospects for establishing such a regime.
This article joins a robust literature in confronting an enduring dilemma of organized politics: who guards the guardians—and how? Building on an agency theory of civil-military relations, this article introduces a new way to think about the American military and its civil-military relationships. Traditional agency theory offered a strong and flexible approach for evaluating the relative strength of civilian control over the military. A principled agent framework takes the argument further by expanding the scope of when, what, and who. A temporal expansion reveals the subtle bargaining interactions between the advising and executing phases of a policy. A contextual expansion shows the importance of considering the broader policy ecosystem when evaluating the quality of military compliance. And a service-level expansion demonstrates the powerful impact of service culture on American civil-military outcomes. The four services tend to act as principled agents, making sense of policy ambiguity through their own cultural logic. After explaining the mechanics of the argument and summarizing the core cultural beliefs of the four services, the article uses two historical vignettes to illustrate elements of the framework in action. It concludes by highlighting implications for practitioners and citizens alike.	This article joins a robust literature in confronting an enduring dilemma of organized politics: who guards the guardians—and how? Building on an agency theory of civil-military relations, this article introduces a new way to think about the American military and its civil-military relationships. Traditional agency theory offered a strong and flexible approach for evaluating the relative strength of civilian control over the military. A principled agent framework takes the argument further by expanding the scope of when, what, and who. A temporal expansion reveals The subtle bargaining interactions between the advising and executing phases of a policy. A contextual expansion shows the importance of considering the broader policy ecosystem when evaluating the quality of military compliance. And a service-level expansion demonstrates the powerful impact of service culture on American civil-military outcomes. The four services tend to act as principled agents, making sense of policy ambiguity through their own cultural logic. After explaining the mechanics of the argument and summarizing the core cultural beliefs of the four services, the article uses two historical vignettes to illustrate elements of the framework in action. It concludes by highlighting implications for practitioners and citizens alike.	This article joins a robust literature in confronting an enduring dilemma of organized politics: who guards the guardians—and how? Building on an agency theory of civil-military relations, this article introduces a new way to think about the american military and its civil-military relationships. Traditional agency theory offered a strong and flexible approach for evaluating the relative strength of civilian control over the military. A principled agent framework takes the argument further by expanding the scope of when, what, and who. A temporal expansion reveals The subtle bargaining interactions between the advising and executing phases of a policy. A contextual expansion shows the importance of considering the broader policy ecosystem when evaluating the quality of military compliance. And a service-level expansion demonstrates the powerful impact of service culture on american civil-military outcomes. The four services tend to act as principled agents, making sense of policy ambiguity through their own cultural logic. After explaining the mechanics of the argument and summarizing the core cultural beliefs of the four services, the article uses two historical vignettes to illustrate elements of the framework in action. It concludes by highlighting implications for practitioners and citizens alike.	This article joins a robust literature in confronting an enduring dilemma of organized politics: who guards the Guardians—And how? building on an agency theory of Civil-Military relations, this article introduces a new way to think about the American military and its Civil-Military relationships. traditional agency theory offered a strong and flexible approach for evaluating the relative strength of civilian control over the military. A principled agent framework takes the argument further by expanding the scope of when, what, and who. A temporal expansion reveals the subtle bargaining interactions between the advising and executing phases of a policy. A Contextual expansion shows the importance of considering the broader policy Ecosystem when evaluating the quality of military compliance. and a Service-Level expansion demonstrates the powerful impact of service culture on American Civil-Military outcomes. The four services tend to act as principled agents, making sense of policy ambiguity through their own cultural logic. After explaining the mechanics of the argument and summarizing the core cultural beliefs of the four services, the article uses two historical vignettes to illustrate elements of the framework in action. It concludes by highlighting implications for practitioners and citizens alike.
This piece discusses some of the history and ideas present during the first decades at the RAND Corporation, the think tank which became significant during the post WWII years and became an important institution for the mentoring and development of strategic thinking in the US. It also had an important role for the development of important areas in economics and business school perspectives, such as game theory, evolutionary, behavioral and experimental economics, and others; and it also was a place where several key contributors to the strategic management field worked (including Herbert Simon, Sidney Winter, and Richard Nelson).	This piece discUsses some of the history and ideas present during the first decades at the rand corporation, the think tank which became significant during the post wwii years and became an important institution for the mentoring and development of strategic thinking in the Us. It also had an important role for the development of important areas in economics and business school perspectives, such as game theory, evolutionary, behavioral and experimental economics, and others; and it also was a place where several key contributors to the strategic management field worked (including herbert simon, sidney winter, and richard nelson).	This piece discusses some of the history and ideas present during the first decades at the Rand corporation, the think tank which became significant during the post wwii years and became an important institution for the mentoring and development of strategic thinking in the us. It also had an important role for the development of important areas in economics and business school perspectives, such as game theory, evolutionary, behavioral and experimental economics, and others; and it also was a place where several key contributors to the strategic management field worked (including Herbert Simon, Sidney winter, and Richard Nelson).	This piece discusses some of the history and ideas present during the first decades at the rand corporation, the think tank which became significant during the post Wwii years and became an important institution for the mentoring and development of strategic thinking in the us. It also had an important role for the development of important areas in economics and business school perspectives, such as game theory, evolutionary, behavioral and experimental economics, and others; and it also was a place where several key contributors to the strategic management field worked (including Herbert Simon, Sidney winter, and Richard Nelson).
Russian relations with the West have deteriorated significantly in the past two decades, in particular after the rise of Vladimir Putin. The factors leading to this shift included domestic issues such as the role of the military and security elite, as well as the reemergence of authoritarianism and growing concern in Russia for the expansion of Western influence in post-Soviet space.	Russian relations with the west have deteriorated significantly in the past two decades, in particular after the rise of vladimir putin. The factors leading to this shift included domestic issues such as the role of the military and security elite, As well As the reemergence of authoritarianism and growing concern in Russia for the expansion of western influence In Post-Soviet space.	Russian relations with the west have deteriorated significantly in the past two decades, in particular after the rise of Vladimir Putin. The factors leading to this shift included domestic issues such as the role of the military and security elite, As well As the reemergence of authoritarianism and growing concern in Russia for the expansion of western influence In post-soviet space.	Russian relations with the West have deteriorated significantly in the past two decades, in particular after the rise of Vladimir Putin. The factors leading to this shift included domestic issues such as the role of the military and security elite, as well as the Reemergence of authoritarianism and growing concern in Russia for the expansion of Western influence in Post-Soviet space.
This article critically examines how the hybrid warfare concept informs Russian academic and policy debate and how it impacts Russian political and military practice. It explains how the concept of hybrid warfare correlates with the concept of new generation warfare in shaping two vectors in the Russian military policy. The analysis of Russian strategic discourse on hybrid warfare paired with the analysis of some trends in the Russian policy-making argues that the notion of hybrid warfare has become embedded in the thinking of the elites and is now operationalized, including in domestic politics.	This article critically examines how the hybrid warfare concept informs Russian academic and policy debate and how it impacts Russian political and military practice. It explains how the concept of hybrid warfare correlates with the concept of new generation warfare in shaping two vectors in the Russian military policy. The analysis of Russian strategic discourse on hybrid warfare paired with the analysis of some trends in the Russian policy-making argues that the notion of hybrid warfare has become embedded in the thinking of the elites and is now operationalized, including in domestic politics.	This article critically examines how the hybrid warfare concept informs russian academic and policy debate and how it impacts russian political and military practice. It explains how the concept of hybrid warfare correlates with the concept of new generation warfare in shaping two vectors in the russian military policy. The analysis of russian strategic discourse on hybrid warfare paired with the analysis of some trends in the russian policy-making argues that the notion of hybrid warfare has become embedded in the thinking of the elites and is now operationalized, including in domestic politics.	This article critically examines how the hybrid warfare concept informs Russian academic and policy debate and how it impacts Russian political and military practice. It explains how the concept of hybrid warfare Correlates with the concept of new generation warfare in shaping two vectors in the Russian military policy. The analysis of Russian strategic discourse on hybrid warfare paired with the analysis of some trends in the Russian policy-making argues that the notion of hybrid warfare has become embedded in the thinking of the Elites and is now Operationalized, including in domestic politics.
One useful conceptualization of culture is that of a preestablished set of behavioral competencies, which in turn form behavioral dispositions. According to this variant of culture theory, decision-makers faced with new situations will rely on established behavioral competencies in forming an initial policy response. This assumption can also be applied at the nation-state level, where established behavioral predispositions may lessen uncertainty and stress in ambiguous yet salient foreign policy situations. Likewise, observers in one nation-state may be able to identify such behavioral dispositions in other nation-states, lending greater transparency and predictability to international interactions. Do such culturally based action templates exist? Are they recognizable even to ordinary citizens? Citizens in Russia, Japan, and the United States were asked to posit the most likely and least likely behavioral responses to a variety of foreign policy situations by their own nation and by the other two nations in the sample. The results indicate that recognition of such templates takes place, and that recognition of one nation's template content by citizens of the other nations typically matches recognition of template content by the nation's own citizens. The research also shows that such action templates can be eroded and become unrecognizable over time, both to insiders and to outsiders.	One useful conceptualization of culture is that of a preestablished set of behavioral competencies, which in turn form behavioral dispositions. According to this variant of culture theory, decision‐makers faced with new situations will rely On established Behavioral competencies in forming an initial policy response. This assumption can also be applied at the nation‐state level, Where established Behavioral predispositions may lessen uncertainty and stress in ambiguous yet salient foreign policy situations. Likewise, observers in one nation‐state may be able to identify such behavioral dispositions in other nation‐states, lending greater transparency and predictability to international interactions. Do such culturally based action templates exist? Are they recognizable even to ordinary citizens? Citizens in Russia, Japan, and The United States were asked to posit the most likely and least likely Behavioral responses to a variety of foreign policy situations by their own nation and by the other two nations in the sample. The results indicate that recognition of such templates takes place, and that recognition of one nation's template content by citizens of the other nations typically matches recognition of template content by the nation's own citizens. The research also shows that such action templates can be eroded and become unrecognizable over time, both to insiders and to outsiders.	One useful conceptualization of culture is that of a preestablished set of behavioral competencies, which in turn form behavioral dispositions. According to this variant of culture theory, decision‐makers faced with new situations will rely On established Behavioral competencies in forming an initial policy response. This assumption can also be applied at the nation‐state level, Where established Behavioral predispositions may lessen uncertainty and stress in ambiguous yet salient foreign policy situations. Likewise, observers in one nation‐state may be able to identify such behavioral dispositions in other nation‐states, lending greater transparency and predictability to international interactions. Do such culturally based action templates exist? Are they recognizable even to ordinary citizens? Citizens in Russia, Japan, and the united States were asked to posit the most likely and least likely Behavioral responses to a variety of foreign policy situations by their own nation and by the other two nations in the sample. The results indicate that recognition of such templates takes place, and that recognition of one nation's template content by citizens of the other nations typically matches recognition of template content by the nation's own citizens. The research also shows that such action templates can be eroded and become unrecognizable over time, both to insiders and to outsiders.	One useful conceptualization of culture is that of a Preestablished set of behavioral Competencies, which in turn form behavioral dispositions. According to this variant of culture theory, Decision‐Makers faced with new situations will rely on established behavioral Competencies in forming an initial policy response. This assumption can also be applied at the Nation‐State level, where established behavioral predispositions may lessen uncertainty and stress in ambiguous yet salient foreign policy situations. Likewise, observers in one Nation‐State may be able to identify such behavioral dispositions in other Nation‐States, lending greater transparency and predictability to international interactions. do such culturally based action Templates exist? are they recognizable even to ordinary citizens? citizens in Russia, Japan, and the United States were asked to Posit the most likely and least likely behavioral responses to a variety of foreign policy situations by their own nation and by the other two nations in the sample. The results indicate that recognition of such Templates takes place, and that recognition of one nation's template content by citizens of the other nations typically matches recognition of template content by the nation's own citizens. The research also shows that such action Templates can be eroded and become unrecognizable over time, both to insiders and to outsiders.
The relationship between military reform in Russia and Russian threat perceptions is influenced by the Soviet past, by Russian domestic politics, and by the character of current U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations. Prospective Russian military reform is endangered by continuing threat perceptions that exaggerate Russian military weakness and by domestic forces that play against a rational assessment of Russia's geostrategic requirements.	The relationship between military reform in Russia and Russian threat perceptions is influenced by the Soviet past, by Russian domestic politics, and by the character of current u.s.-Russian and nato-Russian relations. Prospective Russian military reform is endangered by continuing threat perceptions that exaggerate Russian military weakness and by domestic forces that play against a rational assessment of Russia's geostrategic requirements.	The relationship between military reform in Russia and Russian threat perceptions is influenced by the soviet past, by Russian domestic politics, and by the character of current U.S.-Russian and nato-Russian relations. Prospective Russian military reform is endangered by continuing threat perceptions that exaggerate Russian military weakness and by domestic forces that play against a rational assessment of Russia's geostrategic requirements.	The relationship between military reform in Russia and Russian threat perceptions is influenced by the Soviet past, by Russian domestic politics, and by the character of current U.S.-Russian and Nato-Russian relations. prospective Russian military reform is endangered by continuing threat perceptions that exaggerate Russian military weakness and by domestic forces that play against a rational assessment of Russia's Geostrategic requirements.
This chapter examines how NATO's recent preoccupation with deterrence has been received by Russia and what consequences this may have for future relations between the two actors. It seeks to examine the sources of Russian reactions to NATO's deterrence efforts, emphasizing that Russia's rejection of the West has been long in the making. The chapter argues that it is unlikely that this pattern can be broken in the current situation characterized by very high levels of distrust. From 2014 onward, disengagement and deterrence policies materialized swiftly, on both sides and across the military and geographic spectrum. On the Russian side, the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was immediately strengthened, with reference to 'NATO's build-up of forces in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea'. In Russia, the main concern of the leadership, apart from deterring NATO, has been to reassure the audiences at home that this time Russia will not stand down in the face of 'the Western threat'.	This chapter examines how Nato's recent preoccupation with deterrence has been received by Russia and what consequences this may have for future relations between the two actors. It seeks to examine the sources of Russian reactions to Nato's deterrence efforts, emphasizing that Russia's rejection of the west has been long in the making. The chapter argues that it is unlikely that this pattern can be broken in the current situation characterized by very high levels of distrust. From 2014 onward, disengagement and deterrence policies materialized swiftly, on both sides and across the military and geographic spectrum. On the Russian side, the black sea fleet in crimea was immediately strengthened, with reference to 'natos build-up of forces in the eastern europe and the black sea'. In Russia, the main concern of the leadership, apart from deterring Nato, has been to reassure the audiences at home That this time Russia will not stand down In the face of 'the western threa	This chapter examines how Nato's recent preoccupation with deterrence has been received by Russia and what consequences this may have for future relations between the two actors. It seeks to examine the sources of Russian reactions to nato's deterrence efforts, emphasizing that Russia's rejection of the west has been long in the making. The chapter argues that it is unlikely that this pattern can be broken in the current situation characterized by very high levels of distrust. From 2014 onward, disengagement and deterrence policies materialized swiftly, on both sides and across the military and geographic spectrum. On the russian side, the black sea fleet in Crimea was immediately strengthened, with reference to 'natos build-up of forces in the eastern Europe and the black sea'. In Russia, the main concern of the leadership, apart from deterring nato, has been to reassure the audiences at home That this time Russia will not stand down In the face of 'the western threa	This chapter examines how NATO's recent preoccupation with deterrence has been received by Russia and what consequences this may have for future relations between the two actors. It seeks to examine the sources of Russian reactions to NATO's deterrence efforts, emphasizing that Russia's rejection of the West has been long in the making. The chapter argues that it is unlikely that this pattern can be broken in the current situation characterized by very high levels of distrust. from 2014 onward, disengagement and deterrence policies materialized swiftly, on both sides and across the military and geographic spectrum. on the Russian side, the Black Sea fleet in Crimea was immediately strengthened, with reference to 'Natos build-up of forces in the Eastern Europe and the Black Sea'. In Russia, the main concern of the leadership, apart from deterring NATO, has been to reassure the audiences at home that this time Russia will not stand down in the face of 'The Western threa
The article examines Russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare with reference to securitization theory. Focusing on three main concepts of nonmilitary warfare that have featured in the Russian scholarly military and security debate in recent years – information war, color revolutions and hybrid war – it shows that Russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare, as it has evolved over time, has cast a widening range of phenomena as potential security threats, implying the need for an expanded state response to meet these threats. The broadened Russian understanding of security has some parallels in Western security discussions. However, a crucial distinction is that the Russian discussion has remained wedded to a strong statist notion of security and a preponderant Western enemy image.	The article examines Russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare with reference to securitization theory. Focusing on three main concepts of nonmilitary warfare that have featured in the Russian scholarly military and security debate in recent years – Information war, color revolutions and hybrid war – it shows that Russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare, as it has evolved over time, has cast a widening range of phenomena as potential security threats, implying the need for an expanded state response to meet these threats. The broadened Russian understanding of security has some parallels in western security discussions. However, a crucial distinction is that the Russian discussion has remained wedded to strong statist notion of security and a preponderant western enemy image.	The article examines russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare with reference to securitization theory. Focusing on three main concepts of nonmilitary warfare that have featured in the russian scholarly military and security debate in recent years – Information war, color revolutions and hybrid war – it shows that russian scholarly discussion of nonmilitary warfare, as it has evolved over time, has cast a widening range of phenomena as potential security threats, implying the need for an expanded state response to meet these threats. The broadened russian understanding of security has some parallels in western security discussions. However, a crucial distinction is that the russian discussion has remained wedded to strong statist notion of security and a preponderant western enemy image.	The article examines Russian scholarly discussion of Nonmilitary warfare with reference to securitization theory. focusing on three main concepts of Nonmilitary warfare that have featured in the Russian scholarly military and security debate in recent years – information war, color revolutions and hybrid war – it shows that Russian scholarly discussion of Nonmilitary warfare, as it has evolved over time, has cast a widening range of phenomena as potential security threats, implying the need for an expanded state response to meet these threats. The broadened Russian understanding of security has some parallels in Western security discussions. However, a crucial distinction is that the Russian discussion has remained wedded to strong statist notion of security and a Preponderant Western enemy image.
The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides a simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior from them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large-group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a very conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table.	The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides A simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior From them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large‐group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement But they have a very conflictual view of The United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, The United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table.	The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides A simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior From them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large‐group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement But they have a very conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the iranians coming to the table.	The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides a simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior from them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (Large‐Group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a very Conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table.
One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.	One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.	One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.	One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While Hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that Hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of Elites and their cultural Matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.
We have learned time and again in history that arming opposition forces, while improving their chances in the near term, can militarize and divide a society in ways detrimental to its recovery.	We have learned time and again in history that arming opposition forces, while improving their chances in the near term, can militarize and divide a society in ways detrimental to its recovery.	We have learned time and again in history that arming opposition forces, while improving their chances in the near term, can militarize and divide a society in ways detrimental to its recovery.	We have learned time and again in history that arming opposition forces, while improving their chances in the near term, can Militarize and divide a society in ways detrimental to its recovery.
Geoffrey Parker (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West, Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp.408. £24.95. ISBN 0–521–44073–4. Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. pp.x + 311, index. £30. ISBN 0–19–820670–4. Hugh Driver, The Birth of Military Aviation: Britain, 1903–1914. Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press (for the Royal Historical Society), 1997. pp.xi + 356, 20 illus., biblio., index. £40. ISBN 0–86193–234‐X. Stephen McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995. pp.xviii + 312, illus., figures, tables, app., notes, biblio, index. £23.25 (cloth). ISBN 1–56098–407–4. Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: Identity and International Relations. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. pp.xviii + 210, biblio., index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). ISBN 0–415–11379–9 and ‐11371–7. Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Oxford: Oxford University Press and SIPRI, 1997. pp.xviii + 560, biblio., index. £50. ISBN 0–19–829201–5. Nancy W. Gallagher (ed.), Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998. pp.175, glossary, index. $37.50 (cloth); $19.50 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4813–2 and 4363–7. Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Nuclear Test‐Ban Debate, 1961–63. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, in association with King's College, London, 1998. pp.x + 252, biblio., index. £47.50. ISBN 0333–696–077.	Geoffrey parker (ed.), the cambridge illustrated history of warfare: the triumph of the west, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp.408. £24.95. Isbn 0–521–44073–4. Hew strachan, the politics of the British army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp.x + 311, index. £30. Isbn 0–19–820670–4. Hugh driver, the birth of military aviation: Britain, 1903–1914. Woodbridge, suffolk: The Boydell Press (for the royal historical society), 1997. Pp.Xi + 356, 20 illus., biblio., index. £40. Isbn 0–86193–234‐x. stephen mcfarland, America's pursuit of precision bombing, 1910–1945. Washington, dc: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995. Pp.xviii + 312, illus., figures, tables, app., notes, Biblio, index. £23.25 (cloth). Isbn 1–56098–407–4. Iver b. neumann, Russia and the idea of europe: identity and international relations. London and New York: routledge, 1996. Pp.xviii + 210, Biblio., index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). Isbn 0–415–11379–9 and ‐11371–7. Vladimir baranovsky (ed.), Russia and europe: The emerging security agenda. Oxford: Oxford University Press and sipri, 1997. Pp.xviii + 560, Biblio., index. £50. Isbn 0–19–829201–5. Nancy w. gallagher (ed.), arms control: New approaches to theory and policy. London and Portland, or: frank cass, 1998. Pp.175, glossary, index. $37.50 (cloth); $19.50 (paper). Isbn 0–7146–4813–2 and 4363–7. Kendrick oliver, kennedy, macmillan and the nuclear Test‐Ban debate, 1961–63. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, in association with King'S College, London, 1998. Pp.x + 252, Biblio., index. £47.50. Isbn 0333–696–077.	Geoffrey Parker (ed.), the Cambridge illustrated history of warfare: the triumph of the west, Cambridge university press, 1995. Pp.408. £24.95. Isbn 0–521–44073–4. Hew Strachan, the politics of the british army. Oxford: Oxford university press, 1997. Pp.x + 311, index. £30. Isbn 0–19–820670–4. Hugh driver, the birth of military aviation: Britain, 1903–1914. Woodbridge, Suffolk: the boydell press (for the royal historical society), 1997. Pp.Xi + 356, 20 illus., biblio., index. £40. Isbn 0–86193–234‐x. stephen mcfarland, america's pursuit of precision bombing, 1910–1945. Washington, Dc: smithsonian institute press, 1995. Pp.xviii + 312, illus., figures, tables, app., notes, biblio, index. £23.25 (cloth). Isbn 1–56098–407–4. Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe: identity and international relations. London and new York: routledge, 1996. Pp.xviii + 210, biblio., index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). Isbn 0–415–11379–9 and ‐11371–7. Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The emerging security agenda. Oxford: Oxford university press and sipri, 1997. Pp.xviii + 560, biblio., index. £50. Isbn 0–19–829201–5. Nancy W. Gallagher (ed.), arms control: New approaches to theory and policy. London and Portland, or: Frank Cass, 1998. Pp.175, glossary, index. $37.50 (cloth); $19.50 (paper). Isbn 0–7146–4813–2 and 4363–7. Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, macmillan and the nuclear test‐ban debate, 1961–63. London: macmillan press ltd, in association with king's college, London, 1998. Pp.x + 252, biblio., index. £47.50. Isbn 0333–696–077.	Geoffrey Parker (Ed.), the Cambridge illustrated history of warfare: the triumph of the West, Cambridge University press, 1995. Pp.408. £24.95. Isbn 0–521–44073–4. Hew Strachan, the politics of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1997. Pp.X + 311, index. £30. Isbn 0–19–820670–4. Hugh driver, the birth of military Aviation: Britain, 1903–1914. Woodbridge, Suffolk: the Boydell press (for the Royal historical society), 1997. Pp.Xi + 356, 20 Illus., Biblio., index. £40. Isbn 0–86193–234‐X. Stephen McFarland, America's pursuit of precision bombing, 1910–1945. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute press, 1995. Pp.Xviii + 312, Illus., figures, tables, App., notes, Biblio, index. £23.25 (cloth). Isbn 1–56098–407–4. Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe: identity and international relations. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp.Xviii + 210, Biblio., index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). Isbn 0–415–11379–9 and ‐11371–7. Vladimir Baranovsky (Ed.), Russia and Europe: the emerging security agenda. Oxford: Oxford University press and Sipri, 1997. Pp.Xviii + 560, Biblio., index. £50. Isbn 0–19–829201–5. Nancy W. Gallagher (Ed.), arms control: new approaches to theory and policy. London and Portland, or: Frank Cass, 1998. Pp.175, glossary, index. $37.50 (cloth); $19.50 (paper). Isbn 0–7146–4813–2 and 4363–7. Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, MacMillan and the nuclear Test‐Ban debate, 1961–63. London: MacMillan press Ltd, in association with King's college, London, 1998. Pp.X + 252, Biblio., index. £47.50. Isbn 0333–696–077.
Social groups that are dispossessed invariably seek targets on which they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to explain their dispossession. The managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property as the basis of power is enfranchising a new class of technical personnel among who are the business executives. The "national style" is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been agreement on the characteristics of the American style. The distinctive theme of the radical right is that not only is communism a more threatening force today than at any other time in the past forty years, but that the threat is as great domestically as it is externally.	Social groups That are dispossessed Invariably seek targets On which they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to explain their dispossession. The managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property As the basis of power is enfranchising a new class of technical personnel Among who are the business executives. The "national style" is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been Agreement on the characteristics of the American style. The distinctive theme of the radical right is that not only is communism a more threatening force today Than at any other time in the past forty years, but that the threat is as great domestically As it is externally.	Social groups That are dispossessed Invariably seek targets On which they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to explain their dispossession. The managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property As the basis of power is enfranchising a new class of technical personnel Among who are the business executives. The "national style" is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been Agreement on the characteristics of the american style. The distinctive theme of the radical right is that not only is communism a more threatening force today Than at any other time in the past forty years, but that the threat is as great domestically As it is externally.	Social groups that are dispossessed invariably seek targets on which they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to explain their dispossession. The managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property as the basis of power is Enfranchising a new class of technical personnel among who are the business executives. The "national style" is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been agreement on the characteristics of the American style. The distinctive theme of the radical right is that not only is communism a more threatening force today than at any other time in the past forty years, but that the threat is as great domestically as it is externally.
During the Cold War, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western worldview with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application of the rational actor model is that it typically does not take into account a wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely across time, place, and opponent.	During the cold war, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence According to a particularly narrow application Of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely western worldview with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application Of the rational actor model Is that it typically does not take into account A wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely Across time, place, and opponent.	During the cold war, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence According to a particularly narrow application Of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely western worldview with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application Of the rational actor model Is that it typically does not take into account A wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely Across time, place, and opponent.	During the cold war, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western Worldview with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application of the rational actor model is that it typically does not take into account a wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely across time, place, and opponent.
In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance of personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary Russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the Russian decision to annex Crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the president, those officials themselves represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less security-related areas of Russian politics.	In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance Of personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary Russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the Russian decision to annex crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the president, those officials themselves Represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less security-related areas of Russian politics.	In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance Of personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the russian decision to annex Crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the president, those officials themselves Represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less security-related areas of russian politics.	In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance of Personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary Russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the Russian decision to Annex Crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the President, those officials themselves represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the Annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less Security-Related areas of Russian politics.
Peacekeeping operations have become a central issue in international relations since the end of the Cold War. This work underlines the mixture of defensive and offensive stimuli driving Russian 'peacekeeping' strategies, and highlights the dangers that the new Russian Federation faces in undertaking these operations.	Peacekeeping operations have become a central issue in international relations since the end of the cold war. This work underlines the mixture of defensive and offensive stimuli driving Russian 'peacekeeping' strategies, and highlights the dangers that the new Russian federation faces in undertaking these operations.	Peacekeeping operations have become a central issue in international relations since the end of the cold war. This work underlines the mixture of defensive and offensive stimuli driving russian 'peacekeeping' strategies, and highlights the dangers that the new russian federation faces in undertaking these operations.	Peacekeeping operations have become a central issue in international relations since the end of the cold war. This work underlines the mixture of defensive and offensive stimuli driving Russian 'Peacekeeping' strategies, and highlights the dangers that the new Russian Federation faces in undertaking these operations.
The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the subsequent defection of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the ranks of the Cominform early in 1948 took the world by surprise. This surprise was in itself indicative of our belief that Stalinist control was to be taken for granted at least in the areas where the local Communist parties had come to power through direct or indirect help from the Soviet Union and particularly from the Red Army. Even when no such help had been given, the ideological affinities of Communist states and their need of alliances to preserve the Communist power structures would lead, it was believed, to a tightening of relations with the Soviet Union and to Soviet predominance. In other words, we tended to accept without question the premises of Stalinism.	The Soviet-yugoslav dispute and the subsequent defection of The Yugoslav Communist Party from the ranks of the cominform early in 1948 took the world by surprise. This surprise was in itself indicative of our belief that Stalinist control was to be taken for granted at least in the areas where the local communist parties had come to power through direct or indirect help from The Soviet Union and particularly from the red army. Even when no such help had been given, the ideological affinities of communist states and their need of alliances to preserve the communist power structures would lead, it was believed, to a tightening of relations with The Soviet Union and to Soviet predominance. In other words, we tended to accept without question the premises of Stalinism.	The soviet-yugoslav dispute and the subsequent defection of the yugoslav communist party from the ranks of the cominform early in 1948 took the world by surprise. This surprise was in itself indicative of our belief that stalinist control was to be taken for granted at least in the areas where the local communist parties had come to power through direct or indirect help from the soviet union and particularly from the red army. Even when no such help had been given, the ideological affinities of communist states and their need of alliances to preserve the communist power structures would lead, it was believed, to a tightening of relations with the soviet union and to soviet predominance. In other words, we tended to accept without question the premises of stalinism.	The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the subsequent defection of the Yugoslav Communist party from the ranks of the Cominform early in 1948 took the world by surprise. This surprise was in itself indicative of our belief that Stalinist control was to be taken for granted at least in the areas where the local Communist parties had come to power through direct or indirect help from the Soviet Union and particularly from the Red Army. Even when no such help had been given, the ideological affinities of Communist States and their need of alliances to preserve the Communist power structures would lead, it was believed, to a tightening of relations with the Soviet Union and to Soviet predominance. In other words, we tended to accept without question the premises of Stalinism.
Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by far-reaching defence cuts, conversion of military-related chemicals capabilities and government support for international nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that a large-scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the Russian security establishment. Concern also persists about the transparency of chemical demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a Soviet/Russian binary CW programme, the existence of which is suggested by published archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.	Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by far‐reaching defence cuts, conversion of military‐related chemicals capabilities and government support for international nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that A large‐scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the Russian security establishment. Concern also persists about the transparency of chemical demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a Soviet/Russian binary Cw programme, the existence of which is suggested by published archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.	Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by far‐reaching defence cuts, conversion of military‐related chemicals capabilities and government support for international nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that A large‐scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the russian security establishment. Concern also persists about the transparency of chemical demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a soviet/russian binary Cw programme, the existence of which is suggested by published archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.	Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by Far‐Reaching defence cuts, conversion of Military‐Related chemicals capabilities and government support for International nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that a Large‐Scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the Russian security establishment. concern also persists about the transparency of chemical Demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a Soviet/Russian Binary Cw programme, the existence of which is suggested by published Archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.
Over the last decade there have been major changes in patterns of international defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy – peacetime military cooperation and assistance – has traditionally been used for realpolitik purposes of strengthening allies against common enemies. Since the early 1990s, however, the Western democracies have increasingly used defence diplomacy for a range of new purposes. These include strategic engagement with former or potential enemies, in particular Russia and China, encouraging multilateral regional cooperation, supporting the democratisation of civil-military relations and assisting states in developing peacekeeping capabilities. This Adelphi Paper analyses the new defence diplomacy and the policy challenges and dilemmas it poses. The new defence diplomacy runs alongside the old and there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies. These tensions cannot easily be resolved, but external defence diplomacy assistance is likely to play a continuing role in supporting conflict prevention, the reform and democratisation of armed forces and the development of peacekeeping capabilities.	Over the last decade there have been major changes in patterns of international defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy – peacetime military cooperation and assistance – has traditionally been used for realpolitik purposes of strengthening allies against common enemies. Since the early 1990s, however, the western democracies have increasingly used defence diplomacy for a range of new purposes. These include Strategic engagement with former or potential enemies, in particular Russia and China, encouraging multilateral regional cooperation, supporting the democratisation of civil-military relations and assisting states in developing peacekeeping capabilities. This adelphi paper analyses the new defence diplomacy and the policy challenges and dilemmas it poses. The new defence diplomacy Runs alongside The old And there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies. These tensions cannot easily be resolved, but External defence diplomacy assistance is likely to play a continuing role in supporting conflict prevention, the reform and democratisation of armed forces and the development of peacekeeping capabilities.	Over the last decade there have been major changes in patterns of international defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy – peacetime military cooperation and assistance – has traditionally been used for realpolitik purposes of strengthening allies against common enemies. Since the early 1990s, however, the western democracies have increasingly used defence diplomacy for a range of new purposes. These include Strategic engagement with former or potential enemies, in particular Russia and China, encouraging multilateral regional cooperation, supporting the democratisation of civil-military relations and assisting states in developing peacekeeping capabilities. This Adelphi paper analyses the new defence diplomacy and the policy challenges and dilemmas it poses. The new defence diplomacy Runs alongside The old And there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies. These tensions cannot easily be resolved, but External defence diplomacy assistance is likely to play a continuing role in supporting conflict prevention, the reform and democratisation of armed forces and the development of peacekeeping capabilities.	Over the last decade there have been major changes in patterns of international defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy – peacetime military cooperation and assistance – has traditionally been used for Realpolitik purposes of strengthening allies against common enemies. Since the early 1990s, however, the Western democracies have increasingly used defence diplomacy for a range of new purposes. These include strategic engagement with former or potential enemies, in particular Russia and China, encouraging multilateral regional cooperation, supporting the Democratisation of Civil-Military relations and assisting States in developing peacekeeping capabilities. This Adelphi paper analyses the new defence diplomacy and the policy challenges and dilemmas it poses. The new defence diplomacy runs alongside the old and there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies. These tensions cannot easily be resolved, but external defence diplomacy assistance is likely to play a continuing role in supporting conflict prevention, the reform and Democratisation of armed forces and the development of peacekeeping capabilities.
The concept of strategic culture has become increasingly important in the field of strategic studies. This article traces the evolution of strategic culture as an academic topic and suggests that the importance of culture for understanding strategic issues was also recognized in ancient times. However, it was only in the latter part of the twentieth century that the concept of strategic culture was able to attract the attention of strategic studies theorists. The process whereby strategic studies has attained its present status has been one of scholarly debates and this paper seeks to chronicle that process.	The concept of strategic culture has become increasingly important in the field of strategic studies. This article traces the evolution of strategic culture As an academic topic and suggests that the importance of culture for understanding strategic issues was also recognized in ancient times. However, it was only in the latter part of the twentieth century that the concept of strategic culture was able to attract the attention of strategic studies theorists. The process whereby strategic studies has attained its present status has been one of scholarly debates and this paper seeks to chronicle that process	The concept of strategic culture has become increasingly important in the field of strategic studies. This article traces the evolution of strategic culture As an academic topic and suggests that the importance of culture for understanding strategic issues was also recognized in ancient times. However, it was only in the latter part of the twentieth century that the concept of strategic culture was able to attract the attention of strategic studies theorists. The process whereby strategic studies has attained its present status has been one of scholarly debates and this paper seeks to chronicle that process	The concept of strategic culture has become increasingly important in the field of strategic studies. This article traces the evolution of strategic culture as an academic topic and suggests that the importance of culture for understanding strategic issues was also recognized in ancient times. However, it was only in the latter part of the twentieth century that the concept of strategic culture was able to attract the attention of strategic studies theorists. The process whereby strategic studies has attained its present status has been one of scholarly debates and this paper seeks to chronicle that process
日文研の教職員等による研究成果やセンターが発行した出版物を電子化し、公開しています。	日文研の教職員等による研究成果やセンターが発行した出版物を電子化し、公開しています。	日文研の教職員等による研究成果やセンターが発行した出版物を電子化し、公開しています。	日文研の教職員等による研究成果やセンターが発行した出版物を電子化し、公開しています。
This study quantitatively measured the operational codes of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres according to the Verbs in Context System (VICS) devised by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998). Rabin's and Peres's basic propensities regarding the nature and conduct of foreign policy were then compared through analyses of variance, both to each other and across time. Three main trends were found in the results. First, both leaders' conception of their political environment changed over time, from basically conflictual in the 1970s to essentially neutral in the 1990s. Second, the remainder of Rabin's operational code, including a surprisingly strong predisposition to approach politics in a cooperative manner, was generally constant across time. Third, unlike Rabin, several other components of Peres's operational code underwent acute fluctuations, seemingly in response to the perceived different situational context. On the basis of these results and the operational code construct in general, a typology was created that classifies leaders according to their predisposition to pursue either cooperative or conflictual strategies and their level of responsiveness to their political environment.	This study quantitatively measured the operational codes of yitzhak rabin and Shimon Peres according to the verbs in context system (vics) Devised by walker, schafer, and young (1998). Rabin's and peres's basic propensities regarding the nature and conduct of foreign policy were then compared through analyses of variance, both to each other and across time. Three main trends were found in the results. First, both leaders' conception of their political environment changed over time, from basically conflictual in the 1970s to essentially neutral in the 1990s. second, the remainder of Rabin's operational code, including a surprisingly strong predisposition to approach politics in a cooperative manner, was generally constant across time. Third, unlike rabin, several other components of peres's operational code underwent acute fluctuations, seemingly in response to the perceived different situational context. On the basis of these results and the operational code construct in general, a typology was created that classifies leaders according to their predisposition to pursue either cooperative or conflictual strategies and their level of responsiveness to their political environment.	This study quantitatively measured the operational codes of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres according to the verbs in context system (vics) Devised by Walker, Schafer, and young (1998). Rabin's and Peres's basic propensities regarding the nature and conduct of foreign policy were then compared through analyses of variance, both to each other and across time. Three main trends were found in the results. First, both leaders' conception of their political environment changed over time, from basically conflictual in the 1970s to essentially neutral in the 1990s. second, the remainder of rabin's operational code, including a surprisingly strong predisposition to approach politics in a cooperative manner, was generally constant across time. Third, unlike Rabin, several other components of Peres's operational code underwent acute fluctuations, seemingly in response to the perceived different situational context. On the basis of these results and the operational code construct in general, a typology was created that classifies leaders according to their predisposition to pursue either cooperative or conflictual strategies and their level of responsiveness to their political environment.	This study quantitatively measured the operational codes of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres according to the verbs in context system (Vics) devised by Walker, Schafer, and young (1998). Rabin's and Peres's basic Propensities regarding the nature and conduct of foreign policy were then compared through analyses of variance, both to each other and across time. three main trends were found in the results. First, both leaders' conception of their political environment changed over time, from basically Conflictual in the 1970s to essentially neutral in the 1990s. Second, the remainder of Rabin's operational code, including a surprisingly strong predisposition to approach politics in a cooperative manner, was generally constant across time. Third, unlike Rabin, several other components of Peres's operational code underwent acute fluctuations, seemingly in response to the perceived different Situational context. on the basis of these results and the operational code construct in general, a typology was created that Classifies leaders according to their predisposition to pursue either cooperative or Conflictual strategies and their level of responsiveness to their political environment.
The contribution initially situates comparative foreign policy analysis in relation to international relations and other academic disciplines. In doing so, it interprets the development of the most important explanatory approaches as a response to theoretical changes in neighboring disciplines as well as practical politics. The analysis then turns to the question of to what extent autocratic and democratic foreign policies differ and what significance internal institutions, interests, and external structures (power relations, organizations, and value systems) play in this regard.	Der beitrag verortet die vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse zunächst Gegenüber Den internationalen Beziehungen Und Anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei Wird Die entwicklung der wichtigsten erklärungsansätze als reaktion Auf theoretische veränderungen in den Nachbardisziplinen sowie der praktischen politik interpretiert. Die analyse wendet Sich dann der frage zu, Inwiefern Sich autokratische und Demokratische Außenpolitiken Unterscheiden Und Welche Bedeutung dabei internen institutionen, interessen sowie externen strukturen (machtrelationen, organisationen und Wertordnungen) Z	Der beitrag Verortet die Vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse zunächst gegenüber den Internationalen Beziehungen Und anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei wird die entwicklung der wichtigsten erklärungsansätze als reaktion Auf Theoretische veränderungen in den Nachbardisziplinen sowie Der Praktischen politik interpretiert. Die analyse wendet Sich dann der frage zu, inwiefern sich autokratische und demokratische außenpolitiken Unterscheiden Und Welche Bedeutung Dabei Internen institutionen, interessen sowie externen strukturen (machtrelationen, organisationen und wertordnungen) z	Der Beitrag Verortet die Vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse Zunächst Gegenüber Den Internationalen Beziehungen und Anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei Wird die Entwicklung der Wichtigsten Erklärungsansätze ALS Reaktion auf Theoretische Veränderungen in Den Nachbardisziplinen Sowie der Praktischen Politik Interpretiert. die Analyse Wendet Sich Dann der Frage zu, Inwiefern Sich Autokratische und Demokratische Außenpolitiken Unterscheiden und Welche Bedeutung Dabei Internen Institutionen, Interessen Sowie Externen Strukturen (Machtrelationen, Organisationen und Wertordnungen) Z
Analyses changing patterns of international military cooperation and assistance and shows that Western defence diplomacy is increasingly being directed towards new goals. The new defence diplomacy runs alongside the old and there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies.	Analyses changing patterns of international military cooperation and assistance and shows that western Defence diplomacy is increasingly being directed towards new goals. The new defence diplomacy Runs alongside The old And there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies.	ANalyses chaNgiNg patterNs of iNterNatioNal military cooperatioN aNd assistaNce aNd shows that WesterN Defence diplomacy is increasingly being directed towards new goals. The new defence diplomacy Runs alongside The old And there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies.	Analyses changing patterns of international military cooperation and assistance and shows that Western defence diplomacy is increasingly being directed towards new goals. The new defence diplomacy runs alongside the old and there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies.
This chapter contains sections titled: The Elusiveness of Trust Nationalism, Resentment and Disorientation Curbing Enthusiasms Imagination and Realism US Capacity: Possibilities and Limits Notes The Elusiveness of Trust Nationalism, Resentment and Disorientation Curbing Enthusiasms Imagination and Realism US Capacity: Possibilities and Limits Notes	This chapter contains sections titled: The elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes the elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes	This chapter contains sections titled: The elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes the elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes	This chapter contains sections titled: the elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and Disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes the elusiveness of trust nationalism, resentment and Disorientation curbing enthusiasms imagination and realism us capacity: possibilities and limits notes
This report is the product of a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) selfinitiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era emerging after the Cold War. It was undertaken upon the initiative of Robin Pirie, then Vice President for Strategy and Forces at CNA, and presently the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.	This report is the product of a center for naval analyses (cna) selfinitiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era emerging after the cold war. It was undertaken upon the initiative of robin pirie, then vice president for strategy and forces at cna, and presently the assistant secretary of the navy for installations and environment.	This report is the product of a center for naval analyses (cna) selfinitiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era emerging after the cold war. It was undertaken upon the initiative of Robin Pirie, then vice president for strategy and forces at Cna, and presently the assistant secretary of the navy for installations and environment.	This report is the product of a center for naval analyses (Cna) Selfinitiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era emerging after the cold war. It was undertaken upon the initiative of Robin Pirie, then vice president for strategy and forces at Cna, and presently the assistant Secretary of the Navy for installations and environment.
Many lessons from the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission to the Sinai and the Multinational Force II (MNFII) mission to Lebanon are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories (OT). A final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a US-led international peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operational requirements for this mission. Strategic conditions that assisted the success of the MFO and challenged the MNFII must be considered before US involvement in Israel and the OT. The commitment to the Treaty of Two Viable Parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the US are the three essential strategic conditions needed. The operational environment of Israel and the OT more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The Sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the MFO and MNFII still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the OT. Critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.	Many lessons from the multinational force and observer (mfo) mission to the sinai and The Multinational Force Ii (mnfii) mission to Lebanon Are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the occupied territories (ot). A final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a us-led international peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operation requirements for this mission. Strategic conditions that assisted the success of the Mfo and challenged the mnfii mUst be considered before Us involvement in Israel and the ot. The commitment to the treaty of two viable parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the Us are the three essential strategic conditions needed. The operational environment of Israel and the ot more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the Mfo and mnfii still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the ot. critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.	Many lessons from the multinational force and observer (Mfo) mission to the Sinai and the multinational force ii (Mnfii) mission to Lebanon Are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the occupied territories (ot). A final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a us-led international peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operation requirements for this mission. Strategic conditions that assisted the success of the mfo and challenged the mnfii must be considered before us involvement in Israel and the ot. The commitment to the treaty of two viable parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the us are the three essential strategic conditions needed. The operational environment of Israel and the Ot more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The Sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the mfo and mnfii still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the Ot. critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.	Many lessons from the multinational force and observer (Mfo) mission to the Sinai and the multinational force II (Mnfii) mission to Lebanon are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the occupied territories (ot). a final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a Us-Led International peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operation requirements for this mission. strategic conditions that assisted the success of the Mfo and challenged the Mnfii must be considered before us involvement in Israel and the ot. The commitment to the treaty of two viable parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the us are the three essential strategic conditions needed. The operational environment of Israel and the ot more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and Militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The Sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the Mfo and Mnfii still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the ot. critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, Tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.
When Russian tanks rolled into Chechnya in December 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin expected a quick and decisive end to his problems with the upstart republic. Instead, he found his country enmeshed in a hellish military and political quagmire with no solution in sight. This paper will examine Russia's national security strategy as it relates to Chechnya's bid for independence. It will also analyze the strategic road leading to the use of military power to resolve the crisis. The thesis of this discussion is that Yeltsin's decision to use military force against Chechnya supported Russia's national interests in a unified Russian Federation. The military strategy ultimately succeeded despite a poor understanding of both the nature of the war and the will of the Chechen people.	When Russian tanks rolled into Chechnya in december 1994, Russian president boris yeltsin expected a quick and decisive end to his problems with the upstart republic. Instead, he found his country enmeshed in a hellish military and political quagmire with no solution in sight. This paper will examine Russia's national security strategy As it relates to Chechnya's bid for independence. It will also analyze the strategic road leading to the use of military power to resolve the crisis. The thesis of this discussion is that Yeltsin's decision to use military force against Chechnya supported Russia's national interests in a unified Russian federation. The military strategy ultimately succeeded despite a poor understanding of both the nature of the war and the will of the Chechen people.	When russian tanks rolled into Chechnya in December 1994, russian President Boris Yeltsin expected a quick and decisive end to his problems with the upstart republic. Instead, he found his country enmeshed in a hellish military and political quagmire with no solution in sight. This paper will examine Russia's national security strategy As it relates to chechnya's bid for independence. It will also analyze the strategic road leading to the use of military power to resolve the crisis. The thesis of this discussion is that Yeltsin's decision to use military force against Chechnya supported Russia's national interests in a unified russian federation. The military strategy ultimately succeeded despite a poor understanding of both the nature of the war and the will of the chechen people.	When Russian tanks rolled into Chechnya in December 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin expected a quick and decisive end to his problems with the Upstart Republic. Instead, he found his country enmeshed in a Hellish military and political quagmire with no solution in sight. This paper will examine Russia's national security strategy as it relates to Chechnya's bid for independence. It will also analyze the strategic road leading to the use of military power to resolve the crisis. The thesis of this discussion is that Yeltsin's decision to use military force against Chechnya supported Russia's national interests in a unified Russian Federation. The military strategy ultimately succeeded despite a poor understanding of both the nature of the war and the will of the Chechen people.
The contribution initially situates comparative foreign policy analysis in relation to international relations and other scientific disciplines. In doing so, the development of the most important explanatory approaches is interpreted as a response to theoretical changes in neighboring disciplines as well as practical politics. The analysis then turns to the question of the extent to which autocratic and democratic foreign policies differ and what significance internal institutions, interests, and external structures (power relations, organizations, and value systems) play in this regard.	Der beitrag verortet die vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse zunächst Gegenüber Den internationalen Beziehungen Und Anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei Wird Die entwicklung der wichtigsten erklärungsansätze als reaktion Auf theoretische veränderungen in den Nachbardisziplinen sowie der praktischen politik interpretiert. Die analyse wendet Sich dann der frage zu, Inwiefern Sich autokratische und Demokratische Außenpolitiken Unterscheiden Und Welche Bedeutung dabei internen institutionen, interessen sowie externen strukturen (machtrelationen, organisationen und Wertordnungen) Zukommt.	Der beitrag Verortet die Vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse zunächst gegenüber den Internationalen Beziehungen Und anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei wird die entwicklung der wichtigsten erklärungsansätze als reaktion Auf Theoretische veränderungen in den Nachbardisziplinen sowie Der Praktischen politik interpretiert. Die analyse wendet Sich dann der frage zu, inwiefern sich autokratische und demokratische außenpolitiken Unterscheiden Und Welche Bedeutung Dabei Internen institutionen, interessen sowie externen strukturen (machtrelationen, organisationen und wertordnungen) zukommt.	Der Beitrag Verortet die Vergleichende Außenpolitikanalyse Zunächst Gegenüber Den Internationalen Beziehungen und Anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen. Hierbei Wird die Entwicklung der Wichtigsten Erklärungsansätze ALS Reaktion auf Theoretische Veränderungen in Den Nachbardisziplinen Sowie der Praktischen Politik Interpretiert. die Analyse Wendet Sich Dann der Frage zu, Inwiefern Sich Autokratische und Demokratische Außenpolitiken Unterscheiden und Welche Bedeutung Dabei Internen Institutionen, Interessen Sowie Externen Strukturen (Machtrelationen, Organisationen und Wertordnungen) Zukommt.
This chapter analyzes US policy in the Balkans and focuses on the origins and evolution of US policy in the Balkans during the early Cold War. It looks at the breakdown of alliance solidarity on North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank and examines the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on US interests and policy. The chapter assesses US policy toward the southern Balkans, especially Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. It also examines relations with Greece and also looks at future US policy options in the Balkans. As with US policy toward Yugoslavia after 1948, American cultivation of Ceausescu was largely dictated by the desire to weaken Soviet hegemony in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Nixon administration's cozy relationship with the Greek colonels reinforced the impression that America, largely for strategic reasons, tacitly supported the dictatorship. Moreover, the administration never really articulated a coherent rationale for US interests in the conflict until late in the game.	This chapter analyzes us policy in the balkans and focuses on the origins and evolution of us policy in the balkans during the early cold war. It looks at the breakdown of alliance solidarity on north atlantic Treaty organization's southern flank And examines the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on us interests and policy. The chapter assesses us policy Toward the southern balkans, especially Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. It also examines relations with Greece and also looks at future Us policy options in the balkans. As with us policy Toward Yugoslavia after 1948, American cultivation of Ceausescu was largely dictated by the desire To weaken Soviet hegemony in the balkans and eastern europe. The nixon administration's cozy relationship with the Greek colonels reinforced the impression that America, largely for strategic reasons, tacitly supported the dictatorship. Moreover, the administration never really articulated A coherent rationale for us interests in the conflict until late in the game.	This chapter analyzes us policy in the Balkans and focuses on the origins and evolution of us policy in the Balkans during the early cold war. It looks at the breakdown of alliance solidarity on North Atlantic Treaty organization's southern flank And examines the impact of the yugoslav crisis on us interests and policy. The chapter assesses us policy Toward the southern Balkans, especially Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. It also examines relations with Greece and also looks at future us policy options in the Balkans. As with us policy Toward Yugoslavia after 1948, american cultivation of ceausescu was largely dictated by the desire To weaken soviet hegemony in the Balkans and eastern Europe. The Nixon administration's cozy relationship with the greek colonels reinforced the impression that America, largely for strategic reasons, tacitly supported the dictatorship. Moreover, the administration never really articulated A coherent rationale for us interests in the conflict until late in the game.	This chapter analyzes us policy in the Balkans and focuses on the origins and evolution of us policy in the Balkans during the early cold war. It looks at the breakdown of alliance solidarity on North Atlantic Treaty organization's Southern flank and examines the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on us interests and policy. The chapter assesses us policy toward the Southern Balkans, especially Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. It also examines relations with Greece and also looks at future us policy options in the Balkans. As with us policy toward Yugoslavia after 1948, American cultivation of Ceausescu was largely dictated by the desire to weaken Soviet hegemony in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Nixon administration's cozy relationship with the Greek colonels reinforced the impression that America, largely for strategic reasons, tacitly supported the dictatorship. Moreover, the administration never really articulated a coherent rationale for us interests in the conflict until late in the game.
This article analyzes participant interviews and the PhotoVoice project of 15 young disadvantaged mothers in Pskov, Russia. The women's statements and PhotoVoice were part of a formative evaluation of the Pskov Positive Parenting Program, designed by the University of Massachusetts Institute for Global Health (IGH) and funded by USAID. The evaluation revealed that the program met its goal of helping the women learn sensitive caregiving behaviors. The mothers emphasized that the program met their need for social connection. The young mothers' participation in the positive social network of the group may have been a key ingredient to the program's success and may have implications for the design of parenting programs cross-culturally.	This article analyzes participant interviews and the photovoice project of 15 young disadvantaged mothers in pskov, Russia. The women's statements and Photovoice were part of a formative evaluation of the pskov positive parenting program, designed by The University Of Massachusetts Institute For Global Health (igh) and funded by usaid. The evaluation revealed that the program met its goal of helping the women learn sensitive caregiving behaviors. The mothers emphasized that the program met their need for social connection. The young mothers' participation in the positive social network of the group may have been a key ingredient to the program's success and may have implications for the design of parenting programs cross-culturally.	This article analyzes participant interviews and the photovoice project of 15 young disadvantaged mothers in Pskov, Russia. The women's statements and photovoice were part of a formative evaluation of the pskov positive parenting program, designed by the university of massachusetts institute for global health (igh) and funded by usaid. The evaluation revealed that the program met its goal of helping the women learn sensitive caregiving behaviors. The mothers emphasized that the program met their need for social connection. The young mothers' participation in the positive social network of the group may have been a key ingredient to the program's success and may have implications for the design of parenting programs cross-culturally.	This article analyzes participant interviews and the Photovoice project of 15 young disadvantaged mothers in Pskov, Russia. The women's statements and Photovoice were part of a formative evaluation of the Pskov positive parenting program, designed by the University of Massachusetts Institute for global health (Igh) and funded by Usaid. The evaluation revealed that the program met its goal of helping the women learn sensitive Caregiving behaviors. The mothers emphasized that the program met their need for social connection. The young mothers' participation in the positive social network of the group may have been a key ingredient to the program's success and may have implications for the design of parenting programs Cross-Culturally.
Book reviewed in this article: Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex.	Book reviewed in this article: Ron robin, the making of the cold war enemy: culture and politics in the military‐intellectual complex	Book reviewed in this article: Ron Robin, the making of the cold war enemy: culture and politics in the military‐intellectual complex	Book reviewed in this article: Ron Robin, the making of the cold war enemy: culture and politics in the Military‐Intellectual complex
Based on a case study of the Rand Corporation, this shows how the uncertainties of US defense policies since the fall of the USSR can be understood and illustrated through an analysis of the evolution of the think tank community, and more particularly through a sociological study of the so-called defense intellectuals such as the Rand Corporation.	Based on a case study of the rand corporation, this shows how the uncertainties of us defense policies since the fall of the ussr can be understood and illustrated through an analysis of the evolution of the think tank community, and more particularly through a sociological study of the so-called defense intellectuals Such as the rand corporation.	Based on a case study of the Rand corporation, this shows how the uncertainties of us defense policies since the fall of the Ussr can be understood and illustrated through an analysis of the evolution of the think tank community, and more particularly through a sociological study of the so-called defense intellectuals Such as the Rand corporation.	Based on a case study of the rand corporation, this shows how the uncertainties of us defense policies since the fall of the USSR can be understood and illustrated through an analysis of the evolution of the think tank community, and more particularly through a sociological study of the so-called defense intellectuals such as the rand corporation.
The bibliography presents selective materials pertaining to the role of social science research in international and military policy and operations since the beginning of World War II. The bibliography lists 150 references to books, articles, and reports, all of which are part of the open literature. The references are annotated. The report also contains an introduction which discusses the purpose of the bibliography, its scope, the sources from which the works cited are drawn, and some limitations of the available literature. The bibliography is divided into five parts. Part I lists general works discussing the role of social science research in public policy. Part II lists work which show the trends in the relationship of government and the social science community in the area of international and military affairs since the beginning of World War II. Parts III and IV list literature which suggests some analytic categories to be used in studying social science research and international and military policy. Part V, finally, contains writings which give a theoretical perspective on the roles of applied social science.	The bibliography presents selective materials pertaining to the role of social science research in international and military policy and Operations since the beginning of world war ii. The bibliography lists 150 references to books, articles and reports, all of which are part of the open literature. The references are annotated. The report also contains an introduction which discusses the purpose of the bibliography, its scope, the sources from which the works cited are drawn and some limitations of the available literature. The bibliography is divided into five parts. Part i lists general works discussing the role of social science research in public policy. Part ii lists work which show the trends in the relationship of government and the social science community in the area of international and military affairs Since the beginning of world war ii. Parts iii and iv list literature which suggests some analytic categories to be used in studying social science research and international and military policy. Part v, finally, contains writings which give a theoretical Perspective on the roles of applied social science.	The bibliography presents selective materials pertaining to the role of social science research in international and military policy and Operations since the beginning of world war ii. The bibliography lists 150 references to books, articles and reports, all of which are part of the open literature. The references are annotated. The report also contains an introduction which discusses the purpose of the bibliography, its scope, the sources from which the works cited are drawn and some limitations of the available literature. The bibliography is divided into five parts. Part i lists general works discussing the role of social science research in public policy. Part ii lists work which show the trends in the relationship of government and the social science community in the area of international and military affairs Since the beginning of world war ii. Parts iii and iv list literature which suggests some analytic categories to be used in studying social science research and international and military policy. Part v, finally, contains writings which give a theoretical Perspective on the roles of applied social science.	The bibliography presents selective materials pertaining to the role of social science research in international and military policy and operations since the beginning of World War II. The bibliography lists 150 references to books, articles and reports, all of which are part of the open literature. The references are Annotated. The report also contains an introduction which discusses the purpose of the bibliography, its scope, the sources from which the works cited are drawn and some limitations of the available literature. The bibliography is divided into five parts. part I lists general works discussing the role of social science research in public policy. part II lists work which show the trends in the relationship of government and the social science community in the area of International and military affairs since the beginning of World War II. parts III and IV list literature which suggests some analytic categories to be used in studying social science research and international and military policy. part V, finally, contains writings which give a theoretical perspective on the roles of applied social science.
In this book, senior scholars and a new generation of analysts present different applications of recent advances linking beliefs and decision-making in the area of foreign policy analysis with strategic interactions in world politics. Divided into five parts, Part 1 identifies how the beliefs in the cognitive operational codes of individual leaders explain the political decisions of states. In Part 2, five chapters illustrate progress in comparing the operational codes of individual leaders, including Vladimir Putin of Russia, three US presidents, Bolivian President Evo Morales, Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga, and various leaders of terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa. Part 3 introduces a new Psychological Characteristics of Leaders (PSYCL) data set containing the operational codes of US presidents from the early 1800s to the present. In Part 4, the focus is on strategic interactions among dyads and evolutionary patterns among states in different regional and world systems. Part 5 revisits whether the contents of the preceding chapters support the claims about the links between beliefs and foreign policy roles in world politics. Richly illustrated and with comprehensive analysis, Operational Code Analysis and Foreign Policy Roles will be of interest to specialists in foreign policy analysis, international relations theorists, graduate students, and national security analysts in the policy-making and intelligence communities.	In this book, senior scholars and a new generation of analysts present different applications of recent advances linking beliefs and decision-making in the area of foreign policy analysis with strategic interactions in world politics. Divided into five parts, part 1 identifies how the beliefs in the cognitive operational codes of individual leaders explain the political decisions of states. In part 2, five chapters illUstrate progress in comparing the operational codes of individual leaders, including vladimir putin of RUssia, three Us presidents, Bolivian president evo morales, Sri Lanka'S president chandrika kumaratunga, and varioUs leaders of terrorist organizations operating in the middle east and North Africa. Part 3 introduces a new psychological characteristics of leaders (psycl) data set containing the operational codes of Us presidents from the early 1800s to the present. In part 4, the focus is on strategic interactions among dyads and evolutionary patterns among states in different regional and world systems. Part 5 revisits whether the contents of the preceding chapters support the claims about the links between beliefs and foreign policy roles in world politics. Richly illustrated and with comprehensive analysis operational code analysis and foreign policy roles will be of interest to specialists in foreign policy analysis, international relations theorists, graduate students, and national security analysts in the policy-making and intelligence communities.	In this book, senior scholars and a new generation of analysts present different applications of recent advances linking beliefs and decision-making in the area of foreign policy analysis with strategic interactions in world politics. Divided into five parts, part 1 identifies how the beliefs in the cognitive operational codes of individual leaders explain the political decisions of states. In part 2, five chapters illustrate progress in comparing the operational codes of individual leaders, including Vladimir Putin of Russia, three us Presidents, bolivian President evo morales, Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga, and various leaders of terrorist organizations operating in the middle east and north Africa. Part 3 introduces a new psychological characteristics of leaders (psycl) data set containing the operational codes of us presidents from the early 1800s to the present. In part 4, the focus is on strategic interactions among dyads and evolutionary patterns among states in different regional and world systems. Part 5 revisits whether the contents of the preceding chapters support the claims about the links between beliefs and foreign policy roles in world politics. Richly illustrated and with comprehensive analysis operational code analysis and foreign policy roles will be of interest to specialists in foreign policy analysis, international relations theorists, graduate students, and national security analysts in the policy-making and intelligence communities.	In this book, senior scholars and a new generation of analysts present different applications of recent advances linking beliefs and decision-making in the area of foreign policy analysis with strategic interactions in world politics. divided into five parts, part 1 identifies how the beliefs in the cognitive operational codes of individual leaders explain the political decisions of States. in part 2, five chapters illustrate progress in comparing the operational codes of individual leaders, including Vladimir Putin of Russia, three us Presidents, Bolivian President Evo Morales, Sri Lanka's president Chandrika Kumaratunga, and various leaders of terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa. part 3 introduces a new psychological characteristics of leaders (Psycl) data set containing the operational codes of us Presidents from the early 1800S to the present. in part 4, the focus is on strategic interactions among Dyads and evolutionary patterns among States in different regional and world systems. part 5 Revisits whether the contents of the preceding chapters support the claims about the links between beliefs and foreign policy roles in world politics. richly illustrated and with comprehensive analysis operational code analysis and foreign policy roles will be of interest to specialists in foreign policy analysis, international relations theorists, graduate students, and national security analysts in the policy-making and intelligence communities.
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina of 1992–1995 altered the course of world politics and had a major impact upon the global consciousness. Yet one of the decisive episodes of this war has been almost wholly ignored in the existing literature: the Bihać crisis of autumn 1994. This essay analyzes the role of this crisis in determining the course both of international, particularly US diplomacy, and of the war on the ground. The paradoxical results of the US-led international intervention in Bosnia—of NATO military power being used to coerce the Bosnian Serb rebels to accept a settlement highly favorable to them, in which Bosnia-Herzegovina was simultaneously both reunified and partitioned—may be traced back to this forgotten crisis.	The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina of 1992–1995 altered the course of world politics and had a major impact upon the global consciousness. Yet one of the decisive episodes of this war has been almost wholly ignored in the existing literature: The bihać crisis of autumn 1994. This essay analyzes The role of this crisis in determining the course both of international, particularly us diplomacy, and of the war on the ground. The paradoxical results of the Us-led international intervention in Bosnia—of Nato military power being Used to coerce the Bosnian Serb rebels to accept A settlement highly favorable to them, in which Bosnia-Hercegovina was simultaneously both reunified and partitioned—may be traced back to this forgotten crisis.	The war in bosnia-hercegovina of 1992–1995 altered the course of world politics and had a major impact upon the global consciousness. Yet one of the decisive episodes of this war has been almost wholly ignored in the existing literature: The bihać crisis of Autumn 1994. This essay analyzes The role of this crisis in determining the course both of international, particularly us diplomacy, and of the war on the ground. The paradoxical results of the us-led international intervention in bosnia—of Nato military power being used to coerce the bosnian serb rebels to accept A settlement highly favorable to them, in which bosnia-hercegovina was simultaneously both reunified and partitioned—may be traced back to this forgotten crisis.	The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina of 1992–1995 altered the course of world politics and had a major impact upon the global consciousness. Yet one of the decisive episodes of this war has been almost wholly ignored in the existing literature: the Bihać crisis of autumn 1994. This essay analyzes the role of this crisis in determining the course both of International, particularly us diplomacy, and of the war on the ground. The paradoxical results of the Us-Led International intervention in Bosnia—Of NATO military power being used to coerce the Bosnian Serb rebels to accept a settlement highly favorable to them, in which Bosnia-Hercegovina was simultaneously both Reunified and Partitioned—May be traced back to this forgotten crisis.
An examination of why Russia chose to jeopardize its embryonic partnership with the West in favour of alignment with states like China, Iran and Iraq and what this means for the stability of the emerging international system.	An examination of why Russia chose to jeopardize its embryonic partnership with the west in favour of alignment with states like China, Iran and Iraq and what this means for the stability of the emerging international system.	An examination of why Russia chose to jeopardize its embryonic partnership with the west in favour of alignment with states like China, Iran and Iraq and what this means for the stability of the emerging international system.	An examination of why Russia chose to jeopardize its embryonic partnership with the West in favour of alignment with States like China, Iran and Iraq and what this means for the stability of the emerging international system.
This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of international relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate a number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.	This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of international relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate A number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.	This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of international relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate A number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.	This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of international relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate a number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.